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REPEAL OF THE "EARNINGS & PROFITS"
CONCEPT: THE LIMITATION OF THE
EXTENT TO WHICH DIVIDENDS WILL BE
TAXED AS ORDINARY INCOME
WALTER J. BLUM*
My topic is "The Limitation on Income from Dividends" or, bet-
ter put, "The Limitation on the Extent to which Dividends will be
Taxed as Ordinary Income." This statutory limitation has two
prongs. If there is a distribution in the nature of a dividend, it will
not be treated as ordinary income to the recipient unless the distrib-
uting corporation has either current earnings and profits (meaning
earnings and profits in the current year) or has accumulated earn-
ings and profits. If the dividend is neither covered by current nor
accumulated earnings and profits, then the distribution will be treat-
ed first as basis reduction to the recipient and, after basis is recov-
ered in full, the remainder as capital gain.
Over the years, a now widely held view has grown inside the tax
world to explain this dividend limitation. In general, the explanation
is that there cannot be dividend income to shareholders unless the
distributing corporation has been profitable. If the corporation has
not been profitable, the shareholder must be receiving something in
the nature of a return of his investment or a profit on his investment;
such receipts are not taxed as ordinary income.
It is my position that we would advance the cause of rationality,
simplicity, and harmony in taxation by repealing outright the divi-
dend limitation. What follows are some thoughts in support of
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repeal.
Begin with the history of the limitation itself. The major develop-
ments are contained in two pieces of legislation. The first dates back
to 1916. A provision was enacted to the effect that absent corporate
earnings and profits registered after March 1, 1913, a distribution to
shareholders is not to be treated as ordinary dividend income. One
might think that this supports the general understanding I stated at
the outset. The record, however, suggests that the center of attention
in the legislature was on the time factor. Congress, in brief, did not
want to have the experience of corporations prior to the effective
date of the individual income tax - March 1, 1913 - count in
ascertaining what distributions are taxable as dividends. For this
reason the statute as amended referred to the earnings and profits
position of corporations after March 1, 1913.
The second major development occurred in 1936. Congress then
distinguished between accumulated earnings and profits (or accumu-
lated deficits) and current earnings and profits. One might conclude
that this refinement also indicated the legislators shared the tax soci-
ety's common understanding of the limitation. Once again, the rec-
ord seems to reveal a different focus. In 1936, a tax on the undistrib-
uted income of corporations was enacted. A problem was presented
by a deficit corporation that had earnings and profits in the current
year. If it distributed an amount covered by the current earnings and
profits, but still had a deficit after the distribution, did it distribute
its earnings and profits in view of the fact that it ended the year with
a deficit? Congress enabled the corporation to escape the new tax by
allowing it to take into account any distribution out of current earn-
ings and profits. The aim of Congress in all this was narrow and
associated with the tax on undistributed profits. Thus, history shows
that little attention was paid to the question why a general limitation
on dividend income is sensible for a tax on income - particularly a
tax on the income of individuals.
Apart from the historical record, there is support for the position
that the general limitation is not in harmony with the basic structure
of our tax law. Reflect on distributions by corporations, putting aside
the limitation on dividends. The law divides these distributions into
two major categories. One consists of payouts usually referred to as
a dividend, by which we mean a return on the investment (or basis)
that a shareholder has in his shares. The other consists of distribu-
tions by the corporation which we think of as cashing out some or all
of the stockholder's investment in his shares. The shareholder is re-
garded as though he had sold part or all of his shares in the corpora-
tion. The most common example of this pattern is a substantially
disproportionate redemption - that is, a redemption that leaves the
shareholder with a percentage of the stock substantially smaller than
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the percentage he owned before the redemption took place. Another
illustration is a partial liquidation of the corporation in the form of a
corporate contraction - that is, a transaction in which the corpora-
tion reduces its trade and business activities to a significant extent
and either (1) thereby generates cash and then makes a distribution
of the cash to the shareholders, or (2) makes a distribution in kind of
the unwanted assets.
On the basis of this distinction between pay-outs which are in the
nature of sales to the corporation and pay-outs in the nature of divi-
dends to those invested in the shares, there is no compelling reason
to impose a limitation on the taxable treatment of the dividends.
Why so? As I see it, the person who invests in shares is not making
an investment in the corporate position. For example, suppose an in-
dividual buys shares of General Motors stock on the market, while
sometime later the company declares and pays a dividend of a dollar
a share. From the individual's point of view, that dividend is a return
on investment in the General Motors stock. The average investor
would think it odd to inquire whether General Motors has current
earnings and profits or past earnings and profits. Looking at the cir-
cumstances of this distribution, it is enough that the individual is
assured it does not represent a substantially disproportionate reduc-
tion in his interest in General Motors and it does not reflect a pay-
ment associated with a significant contraction in a trade or business
being conducted by General Motors. Whether the corporation has
earnings and profits should be irrelevant in determining the individ-
ual's taxable income in the supposed situation.
Repeal of the dividend limitation, by and large, would not have
jarring effects on shareholders. I could conceive of a few exceptions
to this proposition. It should be remembered, however, that almost
every change that takes place in the taxation of corporations or
shareholders might be jarring to some participants. My general as-
sertion here is that, all things considered, this change would rate
very low on a scale of upset to taxpayers.
While my proposed change is simple, the existing limitation re-
sults in great complexities and difficult issues. Notably, the two
prongs of the present test (either current earnings and profits or ac-
cumulated earnings and profits, which both lead to ordinary income
treatment of dividends) have never fit together well; and there is no
way of making them do so. To illustrate, take a corporation that has
a very large accumulated deficit. This year is an absolutely banner
one for the company, but the expectation is that next year it will
again lose money or, at best, break even. Think of the planning that
is invited. If the corporation makes a distribution to shareholders this
year (the banner earnings year) the payout will be taxed to the
shareholders as ordinary income. If instead it holds up paying a divi-
dend until next year - and aggregates the profits of this banner
year with the deficit that had already been accumulated, still leaving
the company with a deficit - the distribution to shareholders will be
subject to the limitation on dividend income. What position will the
shareholders be in? They will be treated as having a return of basis
and then capital gain rather than ordinary income. The connection
between the two prongs of the limitation invites game-playing, and
the strategy is unseemly.
Moreover, the limitation on dividend income necessarily calls for
generating a vast host of rules. Let me quickly run through four or
five illustrations, keeping in mind that many more puzzles could
readily be added to the list.
The starting point is to solve the basic question of how the rules
for determining earnings and profits relate to the rules for computing
taxable income or deductible loss. To what degree are we to be
bound by the same accounting rules in computing taxable income or
loss and in computing the positive or negative earnings and profits of
a corporation? Every time an accounting rule or convention is used
in calculating the profit or loss of the corporation for purposes of the
corporate income tax, we might need to know whether the same rule
or convention is to be used in computing the earnings and profits of
that corporation.
Think of a typical corporate redemption. Let us assume that one
shareholder is totally redeemed. Assume also that at the time of the
redemption the corporation has paid-in capital, an earned surplus,
and a large amount of unrealized appreciation on its assets. Dollars
are distributed by the corporation to the redeemed shareholder. To
what extent do these dollars come out of paid-in capital, out of the
earned surplus, and out of the unrealized and unrecognized apprecia-
tion in the assets of the corporation? This question has troubled the
tax system for many decades.
Take the case of a corporate separation, where one corporation is
divided up pursuant to a procedure that qualifies as a spin-off, split-
off or a split-up. The accumulated earnings and profits or accumu-
lated deficit of the intact corporation then must be divided between
the various corporations that emerge as a result of the corporate re-
structuring. But it is unclear whether that division should be along
the lines of the net asset values in the various corporations, or the
aggregate net basis of the assets that go into the corporations, or the
prior profitability of the operations put into the corporations, or some
combination of these three different concepts.
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Take corporate acquisitions, and focus on a corporation that is
very successful, having large earnings and profits. It is acquired by a
corporation with an even larger accumulated deficit. Under these cir-
cumstances, do the accumulated earnings and profits of the profita-
ble corporation disappear? Or do they go over to and survive in the
corporation with the deficit? Now reverse the transaction, so that the
deficit corporation is acquired by the profitable entity. Can the prof-
itable corporation offset its accumulated earnings and profits with
the deficit of the corporation it has acquired? These are very trouble-
some issues.
Let me complicate the matter even more. Suppose an acquisition
qualifies as a tax-free reorganization. The consideration given in the
transaction consists of shares in the acquiring corporation and some
boot in the form of cash. Assume that the boot is in the nature of a
dividend. Which corporation is to be considered in deciding whether
there are current earnings and profits or accumulated earnings and
profits to cover the dividend-like boot? Do we look at the earnings
and profits of the acquired corporation or of the acquiring corpora-
tion or a combination of the two?
Turning to a more common type of case, suppose a corporation
has an accumulated deficit going into the current year, which hap-
pens to be profitable. Further suppose that dividends are distributed
this year, but in the aggregate they are in excess of the earnings and
profits for the year. During the year, shares have changed hands
many times. At some times it looked as though the corporation
would be very profitable for the whole year, while at other times it
looked as though the profit would be modest. Which of the numerous
shareholders who held shares only for part of the year will qualify
for being protected by the limitation on dividend income?
In a nutshell, there are a multitude of difficult problems that have
to be resolved in defining earnings and profits for purposes of operat-
ing the limitation on dividend income. To make matters worse, this
is one area in tax law in which there is no statute of limitations at
work. If there is a situation in which shareholders of a corporation
are claiming that recent dividends to some extent are protected by
the limitation, it might be necessary to dig into the corporate history
to trace the accumulation of earnings and profits. This might require
running through all the redemption transactions, all the acquisition
transactions, and all the corporate division transactions in which the
corporation was involved. In doing so, one has to play by the rules
that were then in force at the time the division, the acquisition, the
redemption or other event took place. What a marvelous job for
accountants!
At this point I must reveal that a Lexis print-out I now have in
my hand shows that the term "earnings and profits" is used in the
Code in well over 200 places other than in section 316 - which
prescribes the limitation on dividend income.' And so you might
rightfully ask this question: if we do away with the limitation on
dividend income, will we not somehow torpedo these other provi-
sions? After checking into each reference, I have concluded, with
one or two possible exceptions involving foreign income (and I am
not sure about these), that it would be possible to abolish the limita-
tion on dividend income without in any way undermining the other
provisions that make use of an earnings and profits concept. Indeed,
I would like to push this conclusion a step further. By doing away
with the limitation, we likely would be in a position to have more
appropriate provisions in some of the other sections - provisions
that are more responsive in dealing with the problems that gave rise
to the particular statutory enactments.
I am aware that the topic for this conference was thought to be
timely because Congress is about to consider proposed new legisla-
tion bearing on fundamental relationships in the taxation of corpora-
tions and shareholders.2 It is therefore germane to inquire: why talk
about the limitation on dividend income at this time? The answer is
that the proposed new legislation would make some rather far-reach-
ing changes in how earnings and profits are defined for purposes of
the dividend limitation. All of these changes move in the direction of
defining earnings and profits not in a way that is grounded on the
notion of taxable income, but on a notion of income in some eco-
nomic sense of the concept.
To illustrate: consider a corporation that is making significant use
of the accelerated cost recovery system. As a result it is able to elim-
inate its current earnings and profits (or at least hold them down to
a very low level). Assume further that it has no accumulated earn-
ings and profits. Thus, it is in a position to make distributions of
dividends which will not be taxed as ordinary income. You can see
why those who are looking for errors or misguided provisions in the
Code might well argue that a change is needed in the definition of
earnings and profits for purposes of the dividend limitation. Such a
change would expand the definition of earnings and profits. For ex-
ample, the difference in amount between ordinary depreciation de-
ductions and accelerated cost recovery deductions would be added
1. I.R.C. § 316 (1982).
2. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Tax Reform Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 494 (1984).
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into earnings and profits. Take another illustration: if the corporation
is reporting the sale of an appreciated asset on the installment basis,
under the enlarged definition the corporation in the year of sale
would be required to pick up in its earnings and profits (but not in
its taxable income) the full amount of profit on that sale, thereby
lessening the force of the limitation. By shifting the definition from
taxable income to a version of economic income, fewer dividends will
come under the limitation and hence be exempt from all ordinary
income tax.
On initial impression this modification might seem sound. But let
us go back to those other provisions in the Code that deal with earn-
ings and profits. Many of them, indeed some central ones, are han-
dling a large problem that is unrelated to the dividend limitation.
The problem might best be grasped by focusing on transactions be-
tween corporations that are in the same corporate empire. The cor-
porations may be filing consolidated returns or separate returns may
be being filed by a parent and a completely owned subsidiary. The
subsidiary pays a dividend to the parent, or inside of the consolidated
returns groups a dividend is paid by one corporation to another.
In these situations we might want to avoid imposing a double tax
at the corporate level on the same income. But we likewise, might
not want these dividends to reduce tax at the corporate level. In gen-
eral, the earnings and profits notion has been utilized to accomplish
these goals. It should be apparent that for these purposes the rele-
vant definition or concept of earnings and profits is linked to taxable
income. Since the object is to prevent double taxation or prevent
something from escaping tax, the yardstick ought to be based on tax-
able income and not on some measure of economic income.
This point is important in assessing the proposed legislation. If we
drastically change the definition of earnings and profits for purposes
of the limitation on dividend income, we eventually will end up not
with one concept of earnings and profits, but two widely different
concepts - one for purposes of the dividend limitation and another
for purposes of various inter-corporate transactions, such as those
taking place within the same corporate empire.
Earlier, I emphasized that the earnings and profits limitation is
already extremely complicated. We seem to be headed in the direc-
tion of having a second earnings and profits notion, equally compli-
cated, but applied in different situations. There is, however, an easy
way out of this trap. It is to adopt my proposal to repeal the dividend
limitation altogether and then address specifically the problems en-
countered in certain inter-corporate transactions, such as those
within the same corporate empire. We would end up with a single
earnings and profits notion - a concept that is targeted to the spe-
cific problems that strongly call for attention. Perhaps we might find
that in trying to prevent double corporate taxation, it is better to
abandon the earnings and profits notion and build on some other
principle, such as adjusting the basis of assets.
I must acknowledge that my proposal might produce hardships in
some situations. It may be prudent to make an exception in limited
cases. Let me quickly describe three of them to convey the gist of
what I have in mind.
Suppose the four of us on the panel decide to form a corporation,
believing the company will need $400,000 of equity capital. We each
put in $100,000. Six months later it turns out the corporation doesn't
need $400,000; $200,000 will do the trick. So $200,000 is returned
to us, divided among the four in proportion to our holding of shares.
Where there has been an overcommitment of capital to the corpora-
tion and the excess capital is returned within a relatively brief time
to the shareholders who contributed it, some kind of relief mecha-
nism might be in order.
Assume that a corporation declares a dividend under some mis-
taken assumption about the facts. Perhaps we should allow the divi-
dend to be rescinded and returned to the corporation without impos-
ing ordinary income treatment on the shareholders who received it.
Troubling, although important, are some corporations that are pri-
marily mineral operations. In effect, they are in the process of liqui-
dating over a period of time by virtue of not replacing their mineral
resources as they become depleted. In that case, the problem might
be handled by allowing some kind of set-off against dividends in or-
der to reflect the fact that the depletion reserve, so to speak, is being
distributed to the shareholders.
But these are relatively minor matters. They do not, by any
means, undercut my major proposition that the dividend limitation
should be repealed.
Before ending, I want to present some figures that bolster my case.
I asked our law librarian to ascertain how many pages of the Com-
merce Clearing House Standard Federal Tax Service 3 are devoted to
section 312(a), 4 which defines the basic concept of earnings and
profits, and how many to section 316,5 which prescribes the dividend
limitation. She counted fifty-seven pages given over to 312(a) and
111 pages on 316. I then asked her to query Lexis on how many
3. 1984 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH), Vol. 1-10.
4. I.R.C. § 312(a) (1982).
5. I.R.C. § 316 (1982).
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articles and comments have been published between 1954 and the
present time on these two sections. It turns out there were fifty-four
articles and comments under section 312 and a total of 128 under
section 316(a). From these figures you might get some sense of the
magnitude of the complexities that we now face. Finally, I asked her
to find out how many cases have involved sections 312 and 316(a). It
appears there are 205 cases for 312 and 1395 cases for 316(a) as of
the week before this conference began. I am not sure whether these
figures represent cases under the two sections or merely citations to
them - nor did I have time to check this out.
But I do have one figure ready at my fingertips. The last time I
taught my course in taxation of corporations and shareholders, there
were twenty-seven sessions, each running an hour and five minutes.
One of those sessions was devoted entirely to the limitation on divi-
dend income and its ramifications. I did resent having to give up'
1/27th of my allotted time to such an unworthy cause.
